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ABSTRACT
Local Law Enforcement’s Counter Terrorism Capabilities
by
J. Ryan Presnell

The purpose of this study was to analyze local law enforcement’s counter-terrorism capabilities
as it relates to the varying size of United States local law enforcement agencies. Data for the
study came from a study entitled “Impact of Terrorism on State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States, 2004.” Statistical analysis revealed
that there are large disparities in the allocation of resources to intelligence gathering, analyzing,
and sharing between smaller local law enforcement agencies and their larger counterparts.
Furthermore, smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent
with the interactions between larger agencies and federal authorities. However, the study did
reveal officers in smaller local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of
homeland security on a level commensurate with those in larger local law enforcement agencies
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

To best protect the American people, homeland security must be a responsibility shared
across our entire Nation. As we further develop a national culture of preparedness, our
local, Tribal, State, and Federal governments, faith-based and community organizations,
and businesses must be partners in securing the Homeland.
President George W. Bush, 2007 National Strategy of Homeland Security

Background of the Problem
The face of terror has changed dramatically since 9/11. Attacks across the world have
shown that Al-Qaida was and still is still capable of carrying out attacks both large and small.
While the War on Terror has taken a toll on their operational capability, they continue to adapt in
order to globally survive (United States of America State Department, n.d.).
While many applaud the fact there have been no attacks in the United States since 9/11, is
local law enforcement nationwide still making the appropriate changes to successfully meet the
demands of a changing threat? Researchers have shown that Al-Qaida continues to move
towards a ‘wave attack’ mentality consisting of several simple attacks rather than one
spectacular, complicated attack, as exhibited by the three coordinated London Transportation
System bombings (Gips, 2005). It seems the terror threat may have moved from spectacular and
complicated airliner hijackings to lone suicide bombers. When researchers evaluate the terror
caused by a single suicide bomber and then extrapolate this evaluation to 10 suicide bombings
being executed on a weekly basis for over 2 months, the terror caused by this ‘wave’ approach is
easy to see. With such an approach being taken by the enemy, one must understand that a suicide
6

bomber or lone sniper is just as effective in a small area such as a Sheboygan, Wisconsin mall as
they are at a larger scale like Times Square. Thus, local law enforcement must be readily able to
thwart and respond to such an attack in every city and town, not just in the larger metropolitan
areas.
In order to effectively combat this threat, there must be several areas where local law
enforcement agencies are well versed. This study focuses on three of these areas; intelligence
operations, interaction with federal authorities, and interjection of counter terror into community
policing efforts. These three areas are most certainly tied together.
The first area is intelligence. Officers from top to bottom must be adept at gathering,
analyzing, and sharing intelligence in a manner consistent with the national strategy. However,
this is not a simple undertaking as terror intelligence can be a complicated skill. Hence, the most
important attribute to this incorporation and the second area of focus is training and mentoring
garnered through the interaction with federal authorities. Here, federal agencies must provide
two things. The first is timely, accurate, and pointed intelligence and the second is training in
counter-terror fields. But in order for all of this to be successful, local law enforcement agencies
must incorporate homeland security into a community policing approach (Doherty, 2006), which
is the third arena of focus for the study. Without counter-terror intelligence being interjected into
everyday policing efforts, the local law enforcement agencies are blind to the terror threat that is
operating within their communities.

7

Scope of the Study
The results of this study answers the question, “are smaller agencies prepared to combat
today’s terror threat through intelligence, interaction with federal agencies, and incorporating
homeland security into community policing approaches on a level commensurate with larger
agencies?” Using a data set collected by The Council of State Governments, this researcher
examined data in several arenas to determine if large policing agencies as well as small agencies
are adapting to meet Al-Qaida’s operational and tactical shift. Allocation of resources to
intelligence, relationships and interactions with federal agencies, and how officers’ duties have
been affected by counter-terror on a daily basis are examined to attempt to answer the
hypotheses posed by this study. By testing the three hypotheses concerning the aforementioned
arenas, it is envisioned that the larger question stated above will be answered.

Hypotheses
When placed together, the hypotheses answer the larger question of, ‘are smaller agencies
taking an active role in the combating of terrorism on the homeland?’ Each hypothesis consists
of three focus areas: Intelligence gathering, interactions with federal agencies, and everyday
duties of officers on patrol.
H1: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering, analysis,
and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies.
H2: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent
with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement.
8

H3: Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of
homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE PRIOR RESEARCH

To find research on local law enforcement’s role in combating terror is a task in and of
itself. To find empirical research would be to stumble upon a proverbial gold mine. In this paper,
only one empirical study is discussed, and it is minor in nature. Basically, most of the knowledge
in this area is not empirically supported; most is extremely well-founded opinion from terrorism
scholars and law enforcement experts. These opinions will be stated here in order to provide the
proper background for this study.
Research, as it is concerned for local law enforcement, has been categorized into three
general categories: the threat posed by terrorists, the role of intelligence, and interaction with
federal law enforcement. Many researchers believe the threat is currently evolving and is looking
to break into new tactics called ‘wave attacks.’ These wave attacks are simpler tactics such as a
suicide bomber, and several of these smaller attacks would be carried out over a matter of days,
as exhibited by past international actions of Al-Qaida. Intelligence gathering, analysis, and
sharing are pivotal in protecting the homeland. Research shows that in order for local law
enforcement to successfully exploit intelligence, they must integrate it into a community policing
framework and be properly trained in intelligence operations because the proper intelligence
sharing network has yet to be introduced. That being said, this training more times than not
comes from federal authorities, as does much of the other training required for local law
enforcement to properly thwart and react to terrorist activity in the United States.
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The Evolving Threat
The threat of terrorism in the United States evolves each and every day. With the
terrorists’ widespread adoption of internet propaganda and training, a blueprint for a successful
attack is simply an anonymous click away. (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 21) .
Obviously, Al-Qaida remains the most prominent threat to the United States. The National
Strategy for Homeland Security claims:
Despite concerted worldwide efforts in the aftermath of September 11 that have
disrupted terrorist plots and constrained al-Qaida’s ability to strike the Homeland,
the United States faces a persistent and evolving terrorist threat, primarily from
violent Islamic terrorist groups and cells. Currently, the most serious and
dangerous manifestation of this threat remains al-Qaida, which is driven by an
undiminished strategic intent to attack our Homeland. Although earlier efforts in
the War on Terror deprived al-Qaida of its safe haven in Afghanistan and
degraded its network by capturing or killing most of those responsible for
September 11, the group has protected its top leadership, replenished operational
lieutenants, and regenerated a safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered
Tribal Areas – core capabilities that would help facilitate another attack on the
Homeland. (Homeland Security Council, p. 9)
Independent researchers would also agree with the government writers of this strategy to
assume that Al-Qaida is the number one terror threat to national security. However, this seems to
be where the agreements might end. In this strategy, Al-Qaida is painted as still an operating
command center actively doling out plans to a well-organized command chain of eager jihadists.
However, evidence from the London bombings have prompted some outside of government to
claim that Osama Bin Laden has become an ‘ism,’ inspiring shoot off cells that rarely, if ever,
come into contact with Al-Qaida commanders. Research of attacks and communications between
jihadists and Al-Qaida commanders leads Ron Suskind to believe “al-Qaeda has largely
devolved or maybe evolved into a franchise operation. Radical groups in various countries are
largely self- activated and self-sustaining…”(Suskind, 2006, p. 2). Suskind goes on to say “10
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planes exploding over the Atlantic or in U.S. airspace would indeed have created what U.S.
experts believe our jihadist opponents desire: an upward arc of terror and dread between a
second-wave attack and whatever might follow, five or even 10 years down the road” (p. 2).
Operationally speaking, it seems Al-Qaida is not in the business of creating large scale attacks
(hijacking an airliner) at a blistering pace but to set in motion independent cells that have the
ability to create small scale attacks (suicide bomber) that not only terrorize for the current news
cycle but for years to come.
What does this operational change in Al-Qaida mean for law enforcement in the United
States? Researchers have gravitated towards the idea that the frequency of attacks may increase
and even be lumped together over a matter of weeks and move towards simpler tactics when held
against the sensationalism of 9/11.
A good example of Al-Qaida inspired terror groups moving away from direct contact
with their command is the plot to blow up JFK’s fuel line averted in early 2007. The plotters had
connections inside the countries of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, two countries not normally
associated with Al-Qaida, and the legal complaint against the plotters never details Al-Qaida
connections. However, “the details of the plot speak to the ongoing debate about the relevance of
al Qaeda's central leadership. While the name "al Qaeda" is never mentioned in the complaint, a
senior U.S. military intelligence officer says that "it's definitely there if you know what to look
for" (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007, p. 3).
While this example serves to strengthen the idea that Al-Qaida has moved towards
largely unconnected cells, the London Transportation system bombings help solidify the idea of
a transition towards tactics that are much more simple than hijacking airliners. Furthermore, a
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firm called Security Management conducted research on over 30 Al-Qaida inspired attacks. The
findings were as follows:

Until now, the same type of target or sector had never been hit twice in quick
succession. The group's attacks on businesses, government and diplomatic
facilities, and the commercial aviation system have been simultaneous or spread
out, not sequential. Before London, the shortest time between attacks on two
similar targets occurred when a September 2004 bombing of the Australian
embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, was followed by a December 2004 attack on the
U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. About five months separated an attack on
an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and a cluster of suicide bombings in
Casablanca, Morocco, three of which struck a hotel, a restaurant, and a Jewish
community center.
If al Qaeda planned the July 7 and 21 attacks, as well as a third strike on the
London transit system that was thwarted or aborted, then this does represent a
shift in al Qaeda's pattern of attacks, says Jeff Chapman, who has conducted
hundreds of terrorist investigations. "We haven't seen this before outside of
Iraq."(Gips, 2005, p. 1)
An assessment from a U.S. Army Military Intelligence Bulletin further solidifies this
finding:

Al-Qaeda no longer believes that single, large-scale attacks not employing CBRN
(chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) have enough of an impact for its core
series of operations. Consequently, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are actively
pursuing a strategy of "wave attacks" designed to hit multiple targets and target
classes around the world using a variety of tactics over the course of concentrated
7-9 week periods. The recent attacks in Chechnya, Riyadh, and Casablanca point
to the beginning of the second such wave of attacks. Additional small and largescale attacks can be expected around the world during the next 6-8 weeks. The
period running from 6 October 2002 to 28 November 2002 marked the highest
concentrated period ever of successfully executed large and small-scale
operations by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Rather than ride out the "afterglow"
period following the Limburg operation, al-Qaeda and its affiliates continued to
strike. The events of the past five days indicate the beginning of a similar trend.
No fewer than four significant attacks have been executed in Chechnya, Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia and Casablanca, Morocco. Additional small and large-scale attacks
can be expected around the world during the next 6-8 weeks. (Venzeke, 2003, p.
1)
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While these tactics have not been put into use in the United States, there are good examples of
these wave attacks on the international scene. Below is a listing of Al-Qaida attacks between the
dates of 12 May 2003 and 16 May 2003 inclusive.

12 May 2003: Vehicular, Suicide Bombing--Chechen Nadterechnyy District
administration building--Znamenskoye, Chechnya.
13 May 2003: Vehicular, Suicide Bombing--JedawalCompound--Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia---al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.
13 May 2003: Vehicular Bombing--al-Hamra Compound-Riyadh, Saudi Arabia-al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.
13 May 2003: Vehicular, Suicide Bombing--CordovalCompound-Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia---al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.
13 May 2003: Bombing-Saudi Maintenance Company (Siyanco) Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia.
14 May 2003: Assassination, Suicide Bombing--Chechen Administration leader
Akhmad Kadyro--Iliskhan-Yurt, Chechnya.
16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Restaurant (Israeli ownership)---Casablanca,
Morocco.
16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Spain House (Spanish social club/restaurant)Casablanca, Morocco.
16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing/ Vehicular Bombing (unconfirmed)--Israeli
Alliance Circle Club--Casablanca, Morocco.
16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Farah Maghreb Hotel-Casablanca, Morocco.
16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Jewish Cemetery--Casablanca, Morocco.
(Venzke, 4)

Obviously, Al-Qaida has shown a propensity towards the wave attack on the international
scene. Researchers believe the wave attack tactics will occur in the United States.
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Intelligence
The ability of law enforcement to gather, analyze, and share intelligence is of utmost
importance in preempting and reacting to terrorism. While this is an everyday occurrence for
federal law enforcement bodies, local law enforcement must also be familiar with the proper
techniques needed to fully use terrorism intelligence. The idea of local law enforcement officers
acting as collectors of terror intelligence concerning national defense is a rather new concept.
Thus, the research in this area reflects this fact.
The most publicly visible product of law enforcement intelligence is the Homeland
Security Alert System (HSAS), more commonly recognized as the threat levels posted by the
Department of Homeland Security in the form of a color such as red and orange. “The advisory
system serves as a foundation for a simple communications structure for the dissemination of
information regarding the risk of possible terrorist attacks to all levels of government, as well as
our nation's citizens” (Kemp, 2006, p. 2).
Obviously, this is the most basic operation contained within the national intelligence
sharing network. One merely needs to turn on a national news network to find out what the threat
level is for the day. For most citizens, the threat level barely warrants recognition. But what does
it mean for our nation’s local law enforcement? When the threat condition reaches threat level
orange (which means a high threat of terrorist activity, which is extremely rare), there are several
measures to be taken by the police. Below is a list of the measures expected to be accomplished
by local law enforcement personnel:

Police and fire personnel should maintain a heightened sense of awareness while
responding to, and working at, incident scenes.
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Appropriate city officials (city manager, police chief, fire chief, and public works
director) should review local emergency response plans and be prepared to
activate their emergency operations center.
City managers (as well as police chiefs, fire chiefs, and public works directors)
should communicate and coordinate with their respective counterparts at other
levels of government in case a coordinated response is needed.
Police chiefs should closely monitor all available security and intelligence data
from federal, state, and other local law enforcement agencies.
Police personnel should inspect building and parking areas for suspicious
packages.
City managers should work closely with their police chiefs to consider controlled
access to all municipal buildings, other significant facilities, and critical
components of the public infrastructure.
City managers and police chiefs should ensure that appropriate security measures
are in place and are functioning properly.
Police chiefs should make sure that police officers closely monitor all municipal
reservoirs and watershed areas, wastewater treatment plants, and other sensitive
public facilities.
The city manager should place all emergency management and specialized
response teams on call-back alert status. This is also applicable to police and fire
chiefs.
The police chief should limit access points at critical facilities to essential
personnel only. Entry control procedures should be strictly enforced.
The police chief should ensure that officers are enforcing the restrictions on the
parking of vehicles near sensitive public buildings
The police chief should increase defensive measures around key structures and for
major public events.
Both the police chief and the fire chief should make sure that critical response
vehicles are stored in a secure area or in an indoor parking facility, if one is
available. (Kemp, 2006, p. 3)
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Obviously, one can recognize how the above tasks could quickly become a large strain on
the manpower of an agency, especially a smaller one. The importance of intelligence sharing
between federal authorities and local law enforcement to properly focus the response is pivotal in
thwarting or responding to a terror attack. If the intelligence process is faulty at any point,
specifically the cross-leveling between federal and local agencies, the results could be disastrous.
However, HSAS is merely the tip of the iceberg. This study shall delve deeper into the collection
process, the reporting process, the sharing of garnered intelligence, and the training of officers
for intelligence operations
Several questions about terror intelligence arise when the duties of local law enforcement
are closely examined. One of the biggest questions posed by previous researchers is how can
local law enforcement piece together “the constellation of clues and evidence related to
“criminal activity (that) is often spread across disconnected databases and paper files in
thousands of local, state, and federal agencies” (Kurlander, 2005, p. 2). Kurlander, a retired
police chief from Missouri conducting research for the International Police Chiefs Association,
sums up the criminal justice data system for local law enforcement below:
In many cases criminals who have been stopped by the police are freed when
local law enforcement data searches are unable to access information that is stored
outside their own systems. Whether a person is arrested or is released for a crime
that occurred in another jurisdiction is frequently based on the ability of the police
to confirm the subject's identity that links the person to an arrest warrant.
Warrants are stored in various databases at the local, state, and federal level. In
addition, terrorist watch lists and investigative alerts are also computerized and
stored in still yet different databases. Most of these databases are not integrated
and therefore the information is not shared. If this disparate data was fully
integrated and subjected to state-of-the-art analysis tools creating a seamless data
grid that could be queried in real time, law enforcement agencies would be much
more effective in both preventing crime and solving open cases. (p. 2)
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As Kurlander mentioned, there is no existing seamless data grid that includes terrorism
intelligence. However, researchers do claim there are several examples that could help serve as
an example for such a grid that will be discussed later in this chapter.
As mentioned above, researchers have found the informational load placed upon local
law enforcement is best described as ‘voluminous.’ Rees, another retired police chief claims:
All of these well-intentioned efforts at information sharing has created a read andreview nightmare for local agencies. Somebody has to sift through all of this
information and determine what needs to be passed on for review or acted upon.
Often this task falls upon the police chief, who is in a position to determine the
need-to-know status of information. Many chiefs spend an hour a day
accomplishing this task, and then additional time and effort in the use of that
which is determined to be pertinent. Policies, procedures, operations orders, and
so on can be affected by information flow. At the very least, the strategies and
patrol tactics employed by officers on the beat continue to be affected by
voluminous homeland security information. (Rees, 2006, p. 1)

As discussed earlier, the inability to consolidate the intelligence into a singular,
manageable format continues to be a failure of the federal government. In conclusion on this
point, researchers have found that sharing is not the problem, just that the inability of federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies to effectively use intelligence within a combination of
the different levels of law enforcement has been the shortcoming.
With the facts gathered, many researchers have pondered the idea of what a national
database for terrorism intelligence might look like. The Department of Homeland Security and
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement is currently fielding the Law Enforcement Support
Center (LESC), a database for use by local law enforcement that is used for retrieving
intelligence on immigrants. The International Association of Chiefs of Police describes this
database as follows:

18

It is a single point of contact that provides timely immigration status and identity
information and real-time assistance to United States local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies on aliens suspected, arrested or convicted of criminal
activity. The LESC assists law enforcement agencies with information gathered
from eight immigration databases, the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), the Interstate Identification Index (III) and other state criminal history
indices. (Kurlander, 2005, p. 1)

The LESC is a fine example of what a gathering point for national terrorism intelligence
could look like. Here, all levels of law enforcement and different branches have access to a
singular point where intelligence is collected and cross referenced, thus providing the local law
enforcement officer with a tool that allows him or her to effectively report and reference
terrorism intelligence.
However, such a database for terror intelligence does not exist. With that in mind, local
law enforcement is not afforded the opportunity to wait on a database to be developed before
action is taken. The communication between federal and local law enforcement must occur. This
allows for the proper passage if intelligence up that chain as well as down.
With that being said, researchers have suggested several courses of action for law
enforcement officers in order to better operate in the current terror intelligence framework. The
most prominent suggestions come in the form of simply adding a terrorism intelligence
collection mechanism to one of the more popular theories of the criminal justice world,
community policing. As far as terror intelligence is concerned, this is a particularly attractive
approach. In order for this approach to work, a study group suggested that there be four focus
points towards this intelligence approach:
Training – Officers must be trained in facets of terror intelligence: what to
recognize, how to develop it, and how to report it.
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Approachability – One of the basic tenets of community policing, officers must be
approachable, especially by individuals who may have close connections to
terrorists.
Promotion and outreach – Attempts must be made to cultivate terror informant
and the general public to assist in the collection of intelligence.
Communication and follow-up community information sources – This allows the
community to feel protected and be educated about how to deal with intelligence
collected. (Doherty, 2006, p. 2)

While the latter three suggestions are already in the repertoire of most officers, the
specific training towards using terror intelligence properly will is a focus of this study. Local law
enforcement agencies are many times forced to depend upon federal law enforcement to provide
the training necessary to prepare officers to efficiently operate in the terror intelligence system.
In conclusion, the ability of local law enforcement personnel to be successful in the
gathering, analysis, and sharing of terror intelligence is heavily dependent upon interaction with
federal agencies. In order to properly arm officers with the proper intelligence from the outside
world, senior officers must rely upon several federal agencies to provide them with a plethora of
reports in order to consolidate them into a manageable format to report to beat officers. Also, in
order to allow beat officers to operate effectively in the terror intelligence framework, they must
be properly trained. Again, local agencies often turn to federal agencies in order to provide the
proper training to equip officers with the tools they will need to gather, analyze, and share terror
intelligence.
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Further Federal and Local Interaction
Within the defense of the homeland, intelligence operations are definitely at the forefront.
However, other duties also require federal and local interaction. The 9/11 Commission Report
claimed “unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a
network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries”
(The 9/11 Commission, 2007, p. 400). While this quote may seem to direct focus to ‘traditional’
information, one must also conclude that other instances of information must be shared besides
intelligence, such as sharing of emergency management information between the police chief
and the fire chief.
As mentioned earlier, researches have decided training of local law enforcement by federal
agencies is of utmost importance. This training must encompass not only intelligence, but must
be ‘interdisciplinary’ in nature (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 5). The Department of
Homeland Security offers several courses to local law enforcement. Some of the courses include:
FEMA Training and National Domestic Preparedness Consortium - Direct training for
state and local jurisdictions to enhance capacity and preparedness
The National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training - Up-to-date, low or
no cost training opportunities for state and local law enforcement officers
Emergency Education Network - First responder information programming schedule
The National Fire Academy - Training and educational opportunities for members of the
fire, emergency services, and allied professionals
Noble Training Center - Hospital-based medical training in disaster preparedness and
response
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The Emergency Management Institute - Training to ensure the effectiveness of
organizations and individuals working together in disasters and emergencies
National Incident Management System Integration Center - Information, guidance and
resources to assist state, local, tribal and federal agencies in adopting and implementing
the National Incident Management System.
National Incident Management System (NIMS) Online Training - Introduction to the
purpose, principles, key components, and benefits of NIMS.
Comprehensive Haz-Mat Emergency Response Capability Assessment Program (CHERCAP) - Resource to prepare for hazardous materials incidents
Emergency Management Exercise Reporting System - System to help emergency
managers track and access exercises
National Exercise Program - Training, exercising, and collaboration among partners at all
levels.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Threat- and performance-based
exercise activities of varying degrees of complexity and interaction
Lessons Learned Information Sharing - Best practices and lessons learned from actual
terrorist events and training exercises
U.S. Fire Administration Publications - Free publications for emergency responders
including manuals, reports & incident reports (Department of Homeland Security)

Obviously, the Department of Homeland Security provides law enforcement with a
plethora of pointed training programs, while other federal agencies such as FEMA and the FBI
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also conduct counter-terror training. This study will help to understand if local law enforcement
is interacting with the agencies that provide this invaluable training.

Summary
To review the research in this field is not a lengthy task. However, one quickly discovers
the pointed arguments being made by researchers and experts within this field. The threat is
evolving into a simpler ‘wave attack’ threat, intelligence exploitation must be improved for local
law enforcement and interaction with federal authorities is pivotal in many areas. All three of
these areas are implicitly tied together. The threat is developing tactics that can be carried out
just as well in a small town mall as they can Times Square. Thus, local law enforcement of small
towns must be successfully tied into the intelligence framework as the larger metropolitan area
officers are. They must be trained in how to thwart and respond to these wave attacks. This
researcher took the recommendations and opinions of these researchers and empirically
determined if small town officers are receiving the tools needed to adapt to the new Al-Qaida
tactics.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to see if the size of a local law enforcement department is a
predictor of more involvement in several activities involving homeland security and counterterrorism. These activities include allocation of resources to intelligence operations, interaction
with federal agencies, and the integration of homeland security into community policing. These
activities will be represented by several independent variables within the data set. By looking at
the agency’s involvement in certain activities against their size, it will determine if the
hypotheses stated are correct or false. Below are the hypotheses restated from Chapter 1:
H1: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering, analysis,
and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies.
H2: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent
with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement.
H3: Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of
homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies.

Data
The data set comes from a study entitled “Impact of Terrorism on State and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States, 2004.” The principal
investigators were Chad Foster of the Council of State Governments and Gary Cordner of
24

Eastern Kentucky University. It was funded by the United State Department of Justice and the
National Institute of Justice. It is stored under the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and
Social Research, study number 4677.
The scope of the study served to investigate the changing conditions that came about for
law enforcement after 9/11 specifically to look at the impact of terrorism on state and local
agencies. The survey was completed in the spring of 2004. The survey was developed by a
research team with state and local law enforcement experience and was formulated from scratch
to explore new developments. There are two parts to the study, Part 1 dealing with State Law
Enforcement and Part 2 dealing with Local Law Enforcement. This study deals specifically with
Part 2. The survey was completed via the internet or traditional mailed surveys. The agencies
were selected through the National Public Safety Information Bureau’s directory of law
enforcement administrators. There was a sample of 400 local police and sheriff agencies, 200 of
those being the largest departments. Of the 400 surveys sent, 46.6% were completed.

Variables
A description of the dependent and independent variables follows.
Independent Variable
The independent variable for the entirety of this study is the variable ‘size of department.’
The possible responses for this variable are 1 small, 2 medium, 3 large, or 99 no answer. This is
a nominal level variable.
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Dependent Variables
There are several dependent variables involved in this study, all of which are interval
level variables. They are grouped into the hypotheses they will help to investigate. They are
grouped as follows:
H1 dependent variables: A12, Our agency’s allocation of resources to gathering,
analyzing, and sharing. The response to this variable is as follows: 1 much fewer resources, 2
fewer resources, 3 no change, 4 more resources, 5 much more resources, 98 NA for our agency,
99 no response.
H2 dependent variables: D10 Our agency’s interaction with FBI; D11, Our agency’s
interaction with FEMA. The responses for each of these variables are as follows: 1 much less
frequent, 2 less frequent, 3 no change, 4 more frequent, 5 much more frequent, 98 NA for our
agency, 99 no response.
H3 dependent variables: E2, Officers have significant new responsibilities in responding
to terrorist events; E3 Officers have significant new responsibilities in terrorism-related
intelligence gathering; E5, Officers have significant new responsibilities in educating and
mobilizing the community for homeland security. The responses for each of these variables are
as follows: 1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 unsure, 4 agree, 5 strongly agree, 98 NA for our
agency, 99 no response.
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Analytic Strategy
Multiple tests of significance have been completed on the variables to test the hypotheses
of the study.
At the univariate level, descriptive statistics were run to describe the basic tenets of the
dependent variables themselves. Statistics provided by these tests were: frequency, percentage,
standard deviation, and mean. These statistics are provided for each variable and organized by
the hypothesis they are associated with within the study.
At the bivariate level, tests were conducted on each dependent variable to test the three
hypotheses. These tests served to measure the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables. First, a cross-tabulation matrix was conducted to visibly inspect any
relationship between the independent variable (size of the department) and the gamut of
dependent variables. Also, Chi Square tests were ran against each of the dependent variables.
The final bivariate test conducted was the Cramer’s V in order to test relationship while
controlling for the large sample size that may affect the Chi-Square test results. This test also
served to compare the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. The
results are organized into each hypothesis.
Finally, linear regression was used to analyze the multiple dependent variables’ effects
upon the independent variable. This served to evaluate the significance of the individual
variables while controlling for the dependent variables. These tests were ran separately for the
dependent variables of each hypothesis. This linear regression supplies the probability of
predicting an agency’s involvement in homeland security against its size.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

In this chapter, the results of the statistical tests will be laid out in tables. The results will
be organized under the hypothesis they are investigating. The results are in the following order:
descriptives for each variable, cross tabulation matrix, chi-square, Cramer’s V, and Linear
Regression (Beta). At the end of each set of tests, a conclusion is made as to whether the data
support or reject the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1
Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering,
analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies. The H1 variable is laid out in
Table 1 as follows: H1 dependent variable: A12, Our agency’s allocation of resources to
gathering, analyzing, and sharing. The responses for this variable are as follows: 1 much fewer
resources, 2 fewer resources, 3 no change, 4 more resources, 5 much more resources, 98; NA for
our agency, 99 no response.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for All H1 Variables
Variable
A12 - ‘Allocation Of Resources
to Intelligence’
Much fewer resources
Fewer resources
No change
More resources
Much more resources

Frequency

%

1
3
53
77
40

.5
1.6
28.5
41.4
21.5
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Mean
3.87

Std. Deviation
.802

Within the cross-tabulation, the percentages indicate the large departments are allocating
more resources towards intelligence operations as shown in Table 2. For example, small
departments answered ‘no change’ 77.4% while large departments answered ‘no change’ 27%.
Conversely, 53.9% of the respondents from large departments claimed they allocated ‘more
resources’ towards intelligence operations while only 12.9% of small respondents claimed they
allocated ‘more resources’ towards intelligence operations. Furthermore, large respondents
claimed they allocated ‘much more resources’ 19.1% while only 3.2% of the small respondents
answered the same. Combined with a strong Chi-Square score of 44.27 (.001 significance, 8
degrees of freedom, n=164), the cross-tabulations show a strong relationship between the two
variables size of department and allocation of resources towards intelligence gathering,
analyzing, and sharing, thus supporting hypothesis 1.

Table 2
Cross Tabulation for Size of Agency and Allocation of Resources to Intelligence
Size of

Much

Department Fewer

Fewer

No Change More

Resources

Resources

Much More

Total

Resources

Resources
Small (%
w/in dept.)
Medium
(% w/in
dept.)
Large (%
w/in dept.)
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1 (3.2%)

1 (3.2%)

24 (77.4)

4 (12.9%)

1 (3.2%)

0

0

12 (66.7%)

6 (33.3%)

0

18
(100%)

0

0

31 (27%)

62 (53.9%)

22 (19.1)

115
(100%)

29

(100%)

Furthermore, a .367 Cramer’s V score (.000 significance, n=164) shows a moderate to
strong relationship between the size and intelligence operations variables. This score controls for
the large number of respondents, thus further supporting hypothesis 1. Again, a strong
relationship is seen between the H1 variables with a regression coefficient Beta of .467 (t score
of 6.862, B of .472, significance of .000).

H1 Assessment
The hypothesis of “Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to
intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies” is
supported by the data contained within this study.

Hypothesis 2
Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner
consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement. The H2
independent variables are D10; Our agency’s interaction with FBI; D11, Our agency’s
interaction with FEMA. The responses for each of these variables are as follows: 1 much less
frequent, 2 less frequent, 3 no change, 4 more frequent, 5 much more frequent, 98 NA for our
agency, 99 no response. These results are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for All H2 Variables

Variable

Frequency

%

D10 Interaction with FBI
Much less frequent
Less frequent
No change
More frequent
Much more frequent

2
1
48
77
50

1.1
.5
25.8
41.4
26.9

D11 Interaction with FEMA
Less frequent
No change
More frequent
Much more frequent

3
94
65
15

1.6
50.5
34.9
8.1

Mean

Std. Deviation

3.97

.823

3.52

.675

Again, inspection reveals the relationship between size and interaction with the FBI,
Table 4. While 65.8% of small agencies reported no change in their interaction with the FBI,
only 12% of large agencies reported no change. However, 87.2% of larger agencies reported
either ‘more frequent’ or ‘much more frequent’ while only 29% of smaller agencies reported an
increase in their interaction with the FBI. Coupled with a strong Chi-Square score of 55.313 (8
degrees of freedom, significance=.000), the cross-tabulation statistics clearly support hypothesis
2.
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Table 4
Cross-Tabulations for Size of Agency and Interaction with FBI

Size of

Much Less

Department Frequent
Small (%
w/in dept.)
Medium
(% w/in
dept.)
Large (%
w/in dept.)

Less

No Change

Frequent

More

Much More

Frequent

Frequent

Total

2 (5.3)

0

25 (65.8%)

9 (23.7)

2 (5.3%)

38
(100%)

0

0

7 (35%)

9 (45%)

4 (20%)

20
(100%)

0

1 (.9%)

14 (12%)

59 (50.4%)

43 (36.8%)

117
(100%)

The cross-tabulation statistics shown in Table 5 for the variables size and interaction with
FEMA also support hypothesis 2. While 71.8% of the small agencies reported no change in their
interactions with FEMA, only 44.3% of the large agencies reported ‘no change.’ Consequently,
54.8% of the larger agencies report they have had more interaction with FEMA while only
25.6% of the smaller agencies reported more interaction with FEMA. The Chi-Square score of
16.290 is significant at .012 level (6 degrees of freedom), thus further supporting the crosstabulation statistics and hypothesis 2.
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Table 5
Cross Tabulation for Size of Agency and Interaction with FEMA

Size of

Much Less

Department Frequent
Small (%
w/in dept.)

Medium
(% w/in

Less

No

More

Much More

Frequent

Change

Frequent

Frequent

0

1 (2.6%)

0

1 (5%)

0

1 (.9%)

28 (71.8%) 10 (25.6%)

14 (70%)

4 (20%)

Total

0

39 (100%)

1 (5%)

20 (100%)

13 (11.3%)

115(100%)

dept.)

Large (%

51 (44.3%) 50 (43.5%)

w/in dept.)

Both Cramer’s V values for the independent variables in H2 show positive relationship
between the dependent variable, size of agency, and the independent variables. The test showed
interaction with FBI carried a value of .398, significance of .000, while interaction with FEMA
carried a value of .216, significance of .012 (n=174). Both tests displayed a positive relationship
(FBI, moderate to strong and FEMA weak to moderate) with a significance of at least .05. The
Cramer’s V results support H2.
Both regression coefficients show positive relationships between the dependent variable
‘size of agency’ and the independent variables of H3. The linear regression for H2 shows support
for H2 as indicated in Table 6.
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Table 6
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Interaction With Federal Agencies

Variable

B

T

Beta

Sig.

Interaction
with FBI

.499

7.460

.493

.000

.350

3.831

.280

.000

Interaction
with FEMA

H2 Assessment
The hypothesis of “Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies
in a manner consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law
enforcement” is supported by the data contained within this study.

Hypothesis 3
Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties
of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies. The H3 independent
variables shown in Table 7 are as follows: E3 Officers have significant new responsibilities in
terrorism-related intelligence gathering; E5, Officers have significant new responsibilities in
educating and mobilizing the community for homeland security. The responses for each of these
variables are as follows: 1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 unsure, 4 agree, 5 strongly agree, 98
NA for our agency, 99 no response.
34

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for All H3 Variables
Variable
E3 Sig. new resp. in terror-related
intelligence gathering
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Unsure
Agree
Strongly Agree

Frequency

7
39
10
90
35

%

Mean

Std. Deviation

3.59

1.140

3.36

1.171

3.8
21.0
5.4
48.4
18.8

E5 Sig. new responsibility in educating
and mobilizing
Strongly Disagree
6
Disagree
56
Unsure
14
Agree
76
Strongly Agree
28

3.2
30.1
7.5
40.9
15.1

Within both cross-tabulations for hypothesis 3 independent variables (significant new
responsibilities in gathering intelligence and significant new responsibilities in educating and
mobilizing citizens for homeland security), a great deal of variance is noticed within the
independent variable, size of agency. Furthermore, the Chi-Square values are not statistically
significant. Pearson Chi-Square for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in
Gathering Intelligence scores had a value of 14.647, 8 degrees of freedom, and a significance of
.066. The Chi-Square values for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in
Educating and Mobilizing Citizens for Homeland Security showed a value of 5.994, 8 degrees of
freedom, and a significance of .648. Therefore, the cross-tabulation statistics coupled with the
chi-square results reject hypothesis 3. The cross-tabulation results are shown in Tables 8 and 9.
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Table 8
Cross Tabulation for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in Gathering
Intelligence

Size of

Strongly

Department

Disagree

Small (%
w/in dept.)

Medium (%

1 (2.5%)

2 (10%)

Disagree

Unsure

Agree

Strongly
Agree

11
(27.5%)

6 (30%)

5 (12.5%)

15 (37.5%)

8 (20%)

2 (10%)

9 (45%)

1 (5%)

3 (2.5%)

65 (55.1%)

25 (21.2%)

w/in dept.)

Large (%
w/in dept.)

4 (3.4%)

Total

21
(17.8%)

36

40
(100%)
20
(100%)

118
(10%)

Table 9
Cross Tabulation for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in Educating and
Mobilizing Citizens for Homeland Security

Size of

Strongly

Department

Disagree

Small (%
w/in dept.)

3 (7.5%)

Disagree

0

Large (%
w/in dept.)

3 (2.6%)

Agree

Strongly

Total

Agree
13

2 (5%)

15 (37.5%)

7 (17.5%)

6 (30%)

2 (10%)

11 (55%)

1 (5%)

36 (30.8)

9 (7.7%)

50 (42.7%)

19 (16.2%)

(32.5%)

Medium (%
w/in dept.)

Unsure

40 (100%
20
(100%)
117
(100%)

After reviewing the cross-tabulations and the chi-square, Cramer’s V tests further helped
to reject hypothesis 3. Cramer’s V for Size of Agency and New Responsibilities in Terrorism
Intelligence Gathering resulted in a value of .203 and a significance of .066 (n=178). For New
Responsibilities in Educating and Mobilizing the Community, a Cramer’s V score of .130 was
reached with statistical significance of .648 (n=177). Once again, the test results fall short of
supporting hypothesis 3. Therefore, Cramer’s V results reject hypothesis 3, as well.
The rejection of hypothesis 3 is furthered with the results of the linear regression tests
shown in Table 10. The low significance scores of .082 and .510 serve to reject any positive
relationship between the dependent and independent variable.
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Table 10
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting New Responsibilities in Terrorism
Intelligence Gathering and New Responsibilities in Educating and Mobilizing the Community

Variable

B

T

Beta

Sig.

Responsibility
In Intelligence

.096

1.747

.131

.082

.036

.660

.050

.510

Responsibility
In Educating
and Mobilizing

H3 Assessment
The hypothesis of “Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have
undertaken the duties of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies” is
rejected by the data contained within this study.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to determine if smaller United States local law
enforcement agencies’ counter-terror efforts were commensurate with large agencies. Prior
research (which did not include any significant empirical research due to nonexistence) claims
that Al-Qaida, which is terror threat number one, is moving towards simpler, wave-style attacks
that would be effective in smaller population centers. Thus, this study focused on the intelligence
operations, interaction with federal authorities and daily patrol activities of small agencies and
brings them to bear against large agencies. The data set came from a study entitled “Impact of
Terrorism on State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Criminal Justice Systems in the
United States, 2004.” The principal investigators were Chad Foster of the Council of State
Governments and Gary Cordner of Eastern Kentucky University. The scope of this study served
to investigate the changing conditions that came about for law enforcement after 9/11,
specifically to look at the impact of terrorism on state and local agencies. From the prior research
and data set, three hypotheses were developed to cover the three major duties concerned with
counter-terror in local law enforcement. The three hypotheses were:
H1: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering,
analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies.
H2: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner
consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement.
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H3: Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the
duties of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies.
Several tests were used to test the hypotheses. These tests included: descriptive statistics
(mean, standard deviation, and frequency), cross-tabulations, Chi-Square, Cramer’s V, and
Linear Regression. Hypothesis 1 and 2 were supported by the data with overall strong
relationships. Hypothesis 3 was readily rejected by these tests. The rejection of hypothesis 3 is a
promising development. However, the significant failures will be further discussed in this
chapter.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
It is possible agency turnover and ignorance to pre-9/11 activities could have tainted the
data itself. Therefore, it should be considered that more than one survey be given within a
department. This would allow for officers of varying experience within the law enforcement
body to offer their view of their counter-terror capabilities creating an all-encompassing study.
Furthermore, distributing to senior leadership as well as patrol officers, would further
allow researchers to test the views held within departments and allow for a clearer view of
counter-terror capabilities from the street to the office of the chief. It is important to take such
measurements to prevent a ‘rose-colored glasses’ view of the capabilities and activities of a
department. This would allow for researchers and law enforcement administrators to properly
evaluate the situation.
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The date of the study was a minor limitation. Since 2004 developments have been made
in the counter-terror field. Such a study should be commissioned more often to allow researchers
to track and properly identify shortcomings and strong points.
Another minor limitation was the number of medium sized police agencies. More
moderately sized agencies should be involved to allow for a truer replication of the actual
situation. That being said, researchers should also strive to create a sample more commensurate
with the actual sample of police agencies nationwide.

Implications for Law Enforcement
The biggest shortcoming was the amount of resources allocated by smaller departments
towards intelligence operations. Intelligence is the cornerstone of protecting the homeland
against terrorism. More resources should be dedicated to intelligence from collecting on the
streets to analyzing and sharing intelligence garnered from the plethora of federal intelligence
reports. While New York City may have a higher terror threat overall, the consequences of
overlooking America’s smaller cities could have a bedrock-shaking consequence for the nation
as a whole. Small town police chiefs must ensure that their officers are armed with the capability
to gather, analyze, and share intelligence on a level equal to those of their big city counterparts.
The federal and state governments should assist in the procurement of intelligence officers for
each county or department, community, and geographic area.
The second biggest failure is of smaller agencies’ interaction with federal agencies. This
failure points both up and down. Federal agencies should make it a point to effectively
41

communicate with each and every law enforcement body, regardless of size. After all, every tiny
piece of intelligence could be the missing piece of a 9/11 sized puzzle. Small town police chiefs
should also make it a point to keep the lines of communication open with federal authorities for
several reasons. Networking within law enforcement has solved countless crimes and will
continue to do so in the terrorism field. Furthermore, networking allows for the advertisement of
federal counter-terrorism training available to local officers, an invaluable force multiplier for
the small town chief.
The last recommendation is for all sizes of local law enforcement agencies. Twentyseven and one half percent of small departments, 30% of medium departments, and 17.8% of
large departments disagreed with the statement that they have not encountered any more
significant responsibilities in gathering intelligence since 9/11. Simply put, this is the wrong
answer for any department to give. While these numbers may seem significantly small, one must
match the results of failure against these statistics to evaluate their importance. In the post 9/11
world, the citizenry is counting on each certified peace officer and his or her agency to intently
gather counter-terror intelligence. To have not changed intelligence gathering approaches since
9/11 is to have failed the citizenry, regardless of agency size or area of jurisdiction.
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